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Butler (The Arguments of the Philosophers Series), by Terrence Penelhum. 
London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985. pp. x + 221. Cloth $39.95. 
Reviewed by DAVID E. WHITE, St. John Fisher College. 
This book is in two parts with the larger devoted to the rehabilitation of Butler's 
philosophy of religion, which Penelhum ranks second in English only to Hume's 
(p. vii). A rehabilitation is needed to resist what might be called the received 
view of Butler's philosophical theology: the Analogy is directed to the stance of 
the deists, but there are no deists now; hence, neglect of Butler's work is justified 
(p. 6). Penelhum rejects the second premise with two references, but is mainly 
concerned to argue against the validity of this argument, not just against its 
soundness. 
Philosophers often write as if their work had universal significance, only to 
have critics find their endeavors parochial. With Butler the reverse seems to 
have been the case. His stated aims are modest, but commentators have found 
in him the very archetype of a fully sufficient philosophy of religion. 
So Penelhum's central question is important both for intellectual history and 
for what is Penelhum's main interest, contemporary philosophy of religion. 
Penelhum's work is excellent; he puts just the right emphasis on just the right 
points and, at least with regard to the Analogy, much of his analysis is ground-
breaking. My complaints concern matters of detail on the one hand and omission 
on the other. The principal shortcoming is that just when things get really 
interesting, Penelhum calls an abrupt halt to the inquiry. 
Very early on (p. 4) Penelhum makes the key point, which he never tires of 
repeating: "although a theorist of the highest quality," Butler is "not interested 
in theory for itself'; rather his "purpose is always a practical one." It is commonly 
acknowledged that in matters of practice, when we are forced to decide, we 
must settle for a far lesser degree of evidence than would compel full intellectual 
assent. So, since religion is a practical matter, no more can be demanded of the 
"proof' of religion than would be demanded of a secular choice of comparable 
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importance. This is the parity argument as Butler employs it. For his final 
assessment of this argument, Penelhum refers us (p. 198) to his section on 
pragmatics. ("Pragmatics" is never again mentioned, but presumably what Pen-
elhum means is his discussion of the appeal to prudence.) After some discussion, 
Penelhum dismisses the "analogical" argument as obsolete (p. 200), but finds a 
salvageable core in the notion of a cumulative case; indeed he points out that 
Butler was aware that his argument must be judged as a whole if it is to have 
any hope of success. Then Penelhum tells us that the cumulative case still ends 
in a "deadlock" that can be broken only by the appeal to prudence (p. 201). 
After a brief argument to show that Butler's "view of what it is to act on the 
claims of Christianity requires, in the end, that one believe those claims," Pen-
elhum states: "If this is a correct understanding of where Butler's practical 
apologetics leads, an adequate assessment of it requires examination of the nature 
of belief and the ethics of it. Such an examination is out of the question here" 
(p. 205). Two pages later, the book ends. 
In my judgment, Penelhum's understanding of where Butler's practical 
apologetic leads is correct, and therefore it is especially disappointing that the 
discussion ends where it does. Penelhum is careful to emphasize the many aspects 
and implications of Butler's argument; he specifies the kind of parity argument 
Butler uses, (that Butler's is a "wholistic" cumulative case), and he delineates 
how and why the appeal to prudence is vital. It would be especially interesting 
to see how an analysis so well begun would eventually end. Penelhum decided 
to leave aside the topic of freedom since Butler's comments are, as Butler himself 
notes, a digression (p. vii). But considering that Penelhum stops just when the 
relationship of belief and practice becomes crucial, a natural continuation of the 
argument in Butler might be found in "Of the Opinion of Necessity, considered 
as influencing Practice," (Analogy, I vi), which is at least as useful as the remarks 
on "naturally virtuous conduct" (Analogy, I v), which Penelhum does discuss. 
If the topic of necessity or freedom is off Penelhum's subject, the topic of opinion 
and practice is very much on it. 
My only other major regret is that Penelhum gives so little attention to the 
burden of proof. He assigns the "onus" to those who demand more of religion 
than of secular claims (p. 198), but he never makes the association of Butler's 
generally forensic style of argument with the prudential rather than evidential 
considerations that usually lead us to assign the burden of proof to one side or 
the other. Nor does he explicitly mention that failure to discharge the burden of 
proof is decisive only as far as practice is concerned and not in matters of 
speculation where an indefinite suspension of judgment is possible. In these 
terms, the salvageable core of Butler's reasoning might be as follows: There are 
good prudential considerations in favor of religion, but prudential considerations 
are sufficient only to establish a practical presumption and not to settle a matter 
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of fact. But then religion simply is a practical matter, so prudential considerations 
could be decisive as long as the opponents of religion have not proved religion 
false. Philosophers of religion who accept this outline of an apologetic strategy 
mayor may not want to follow Butler in detail. 
There are a few annoying slips. Penelhum says that the Analogy is out of 
print, yet he never mentions the Italian edition of Butler's complete works. 
Penelhum leaves it an open question whether Butler was offered the See of 
Canterbury, yet he does not mention Sykes' articles (Theology, 1936 and 1957) 
that seem to prove the negative. Butler himself is very seriously misquoted on 
p. 203. There are also some traps for less sophisticated readers who might 
conclude from what Penelhum says that Butler quoted Hume (p. 198), or that 
Pascal mentions punishment in his wager (p. 203). But these are minor tlaws 
compared with the thoroughly admirable job Penelhum does of setting out and 
evaluating the main lines of Butler's argument. 
The section on Butler's ethics is somewhat less original, but could serve as 
an introduction to a serious study of the Sermons. Penelhum has a knack for 
stating with clarity and precision what many readers will already know in a 
vague and general way, (e.g., the second paragraph on p. 43.) This section also 
contains an appropriate discussion of Sturgeon's important article on the role of 
conSClence. 
I hope this book will be widely read. It is especially suited to philosophers 
of religion who have neglected Butler but would listen to someone who had 
"forty good reasons" why they should take up the Analogy. 
One ofthe more significant references to C. D. Broad is omitted from the index. 
Faith, Reason, and History: Rethinking Kierkegaard's Philosophical Fragments, 
by Robert C. Roberts. Macon, Georgia: Mercer University Press, 1986, 145 
pp. + vi. $22.50. 
Reviewed by C. STEPHEN EVANS, St. Olaf College. 
Robert Roberts' Faith, Reason, and History brings what might be termed the 
analytic approach (using the term in a broad sense) to the study of Kierkegaard 
to a new standard. I know of no other book dealing with the Johannes Climacus 
pseudonym section of the Kierkegaardian authorship which does so much to 
bring Kierkegaard into a living relationship with contemporary debates in epis-
temology, philosophy of religion, and theology. The gracefulness of the writing, 
the clarity and precision of the arguments, and the pointed application to signif-
